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ABSTRACT  
The growing literature on housing finacialisation offers an increasingly fine-grained analysis 
of how financial actors shape housing markets and systems internationally. Nevertheless, a 
lack of clarity remains about the geographical and temporally specific ways that 
financialisation grafts onto and amplifies wider neoliberal housing restructuring, as well as 
the role the global financial crisis (GFC) plays in its variegated trajectories. In this paper, we 
address this problematic by situating housing fincialisation within the context of longer-
term neoliberal restructuring via a comparative analysis of Ireland and Australia. Our 
empirical and conceptual aims are two-fold. First, we deploy our comparison to disentangle 
housing financialisation from wider processes of neoliberal restructuring and identify the 
moments in which financialisation acts as a crucial accelerant that amplifies but also 
mutates extant path dependent trajectories. Second we mobilise comparison to reflect 
critically on the role that crisis and crisis discourses play in facilitating regulatory 
restructuring through financialised logics. While in Ireland the crash formed a juncture for 
regulatory capture by financial actors and the deepening of financialisation as a core 
component of housing, Australia’s response to the GFC was a reassertion of the neoliberal 
status-quo. However, we contend that Australia’s housing markets are now characterised by 
many aspects of financialisation and remain vulnerable to its impacts. We argue that 
comparative analysis allows us to view the path dependent nature of neoliberal 
restructuring as well as the variegated geographies and temporalities of financialisation on 
housing regimes internationally. 
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1. Introduction 
Housing literature informed by critical political economy has pointed to the emergence of a 
set of global conditions associated with the financialisation of housing (Madden and 
Marcuse, 2016), while housing forms a backbone to contemporary understandings of 
financialisation (Aalbers, 2016). Scholarly analyses have characterised housing 
financialisation prior to the global financial crisis (GFC) as focused on capital switching into 
property and mortgage markets and the expansion of secondary mortgage markets 
(Christophers, 2014); while, following the GFC, these processes were consolidated through 
financial actors “capitalising” on the crisis (Waldron, 2018) by buying up distressed assets, 
pushing new regulatory and policy instruments, and extending a new “frontier” of 
financialisation into rental housing (Fields, 2018). Housing researchers have claimed that, 
cumulatively, these shifts have resulted in global trends of price escalation, unaffordability, 
declining ownership, rising rental costs, homelessness and, in the Global North, a 
concomitant residualisation of social housing (Aalbers, 2015). 
 
Nevertheless, there are ongoing debates about the utility and limits of the concept of 
financialisation itself (Christophers, 2015a). In large part due to its centrality to 
understandings of the 2008 GFC, financialisation has been linked to and often made 
indistinguishable from neoliberalisation and globalisation. By foregrounding the 
financialisation of mortgage markets as the cause of the crisis (particularly via the mortgage-
debt crisis), rather than as one key component of a more general and longer-term set of 
shifts, research obscured the interplay between the deployment of mechanisms of financial 
engineering and long-term neoliberal restructuring of housing systems. Nonetheless, more 
recent finer-grained work has shed light on this interplay (see Aalbers, 2019a for an 
overview). Recent empirical work on financialisation adds greater precision to the concept 
in at least two respects. First, it identifies and elaborates the specific mechanisms, 
technologies and practices through which different housing sectors are made more 
financialised (Fields, 2018). Second, it emphasises the role of the State in facilitating or 
mediating processes and practices of financialisation (Beswick and Penny, 2018; Ward and 
Swyngedouw, 2018). Thus a clearer picture has begun to emerge of the ways that financial 
actors seek to shape the regulatory and institutional structures of housing markets and 
systems within and across particular historical moments.  
 
In line with this research trajectory, we seek to situate financialisation – understood as a set 
of mechanisms, practices and technologies – within the context of longer-term neoliberal 
state restructuring of housing and to parse its geographically and temporally contingent 
unfolding. We do so through a comparative analysis of the restructuring of housing in two 
very different contexts—Ireland and Australia—both of which are characterised by 
neoliberalisation and largely converge on the global housing conditions asserted in the 
literature. Both nations’ housing systems are characterised by the dominance of (debt-
based) homeownership, social housing residualisation, and the emergence of “generation 
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rent” (Maalsen, 2018)  Yet important differences exist in terms of housing policy systems, 
the texture of neoliberalisation and, significantly, exposure and responses to the GFC. Via a 
comparative analysis that broadly traces geographically and temporally differentiated 
processes of financialisation through longer-term shifts in housing systems, the GFC and its 
aftermath, we suggest that systemic similarities in the trajectories of housing 
financialisating are emergent across both countries. 
 
In positioning our analysis of the variageted dynamics of housing systems in terms of the 
relationship between neoliberalisaing policy path dependencies and the critical juncture of 
the GFC, our empirical and conceptual aims are two-fold. First, we deploy our comparison to 
highlight how processes and practices of financialisation are contingently layered onto (but 
also transform) the shifting contours of the neoliberal state. In doing so, we disentangle 
housing financialisation from wider processes of neoliberal restructuring and identify the 
moments in which financialisation acts as a crucial accelerant that amplifies but also 
mutates extant path dependent trajectories. In line with moves in the financialisation 
literature away from big picture narratives of transformations in late capitalism and towards 
understandings of the role of specific practices in the property-finance nexus, we contend 
that the GFC is an important heuristic in apprehending points of transformation, but only if 
we can begin to tease out housing financialisation as a contingent outcome of longer-term 
neoliberal restructuring. Second we mobilise comparison to reflect critically on the role that 
crisis and crisis discourses can play in facilitating regulatory restructuring through 
financialised logics, resulting in amplification and intensification of the financialisation 
process. In doing so, we redress the sense in which the centrality of ‘crisis’ in conceptual and 
empirical investigations of financialisation and its geographical impacts has contributed to a 
lack of definition around the situated and differentiated workings of financialization in 
transforming housing systems over the longer term.  
 
Methodologically, we draw primarily on desk-top analysis via systems embedded research 
aimed to “identify the dynamic between policy and institutions including the market; and 
the interaction between the housing system and wider socio-economic institutions…” 
(Stephens 2011: 353). We combine reviews in Ireland and Australia of housing scholarship, 
grey literature and secondary sources across the housing and financial fields, combined with 
contemporaneous media analysis of mainstream and more specialised media. We 
developed comparative tables to trace key policy trends and the parameters that have 
shaped the contingent configuration of common trajectories in each context. We used these 
to pinpoint key dimensions of common trajectories and differentiation, structuring our 
analysis broadly around pre- and post-crisis tendencies and their relationship to 
financialisation.   
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we outline the literature on housing financialisation, 
paying particular attention to two conceptual questions: the relationship between 
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theorisations of financialisation and neoliberal restructuring and the neoliberalised state, 
and the empirical and conceptual role of ‘crisis’ in mediating understandings. We then offer 
an overview of the restructuring of housing systems in Ireland and Australia up until the 
GFC, before detailing the divergent responses of these countries to the GFC, in particular 
identifying the points at which housing financialisation has been deepened or anticipated. In 
conclusion, we offer an analysis of the interplay between housing financialisation, the 
neoliberal state and the juncture of crisis and ‘crisis-talk’ across both cases. 
 
2. Housing (financialisation) and the neoliberalised state 
Financialisation has claimed to offer an explanatory framework for understanding 
restructuring relationships between states, markets, and society in late capitalism. The 
concept provides a new thread (the growing power of finance capital and financial logics) 
layered onto established narratives previously captured under the banner of 
neoliberalisation or globalisation (Peck, 2010). As defined by Aalbers (2017, 3),  
financialisation refers to “the increasing dominance of financial actors, markets, practices, 
measurements and narratives, at various scales, resulting in a structural transformation of 
economies, firms (including financial institutions), states and households”. Others, however, 
find the concept theoretically imprecise (Christophers, 2015a) and lacking distinction from 
wider neoliberal restructuring. Perhaps inevitably, the “the onset of the global financial 
crisis” (ibid, 184, emphasis in original) triggered an explosion of scholarly attention on 
financialisation. The GFC was a lightening-rod both as the apotheosis of a particular 
narrative trajectory of the financialisation of capitalism and as a conceptual lens through 
which to understand the significance of housing in the collapse of the global economy. Yet 
this has instituted a sort of circular reasoning whereby “sometimes financialisation is the 
explanandum (the phenomenon to be explained), sometimes the explanans (the thing that 
explains) and sometimes as a mechanism intervening between causes and consequences” 
Aalbers (2016, 2). 
 
Debates on financialisation have been keenly aware of this dilemma, perhaps nowhere 
moreso than with regard to housing financialisation. As such, literature on housing 
financialisation sits at the intersection between explanations of macro-level shifts in 
capitalism and more specialist accounts of how dynamic intersections between housing, 
real-estate and rentier capitalism are instrumental in restructuring cities, welfare regimes 
and households. Many commentators locate the root cause of the global housing crisis in 
the growing commodification of housing (Madden and Marcuse, 2016), in turn viewed as an 
outcome of financialisation. However, these accounts are often characterised by a lack of 
conceptual distinction between financialisation as a specific mode of treating housing 
provision, and the restructuring of the central role of housing in state welfare systems under 
neoliberalism. In the wake of the GFC, a set of studies have sought to explain secondary 
mortgage market dynamics as a trigger for the credit crunch and the collapse of financial 
insitutions (Christophers, 2015b). In explicating these dynamics, however, the narrative 
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inevitably becomes entangled in more nebulous, longer-term processes of restructuring at a 
range of scales. As such, this work treated housing financialisation in terms of broader 
transformations of the capitalist system from the 1970s, in particular the transition to 
neoliberalism, wherein capitalism’s inherent overaccumulation ‘crises’ have been addressed 
via financial engineering’s facilitation of ‘capital switching’ to the secondary circuit 
(Christophers, 2011). Following Harvey (2010), this work emphasised how neoliberalism’s 
impact on wage stagnation was temporarily solved by the expansion of credit, notably 
mortgage-credit, to middle- and working-class households. Coupled with this is the 
expansion and qualitative transformation of capital switching into built environments 
(Christophers, 2011) with the problem of real estate’s illiquidity and spatial fixity being 
overcome by financial engineering  through which real estate has transformed from spatially 
fixed into a transferable financial asset (Aalbers, 2016). However, questions abound about 
whether the restructuring of housing and real estate more generally is the outcome of 
processes of financialisation or, alternatively, whether financialisation aptly describes a set 
of technologies and calculative practices that ampify and accelerate existing tendencies of 
wider neoliberal restructuring of economy, society and of the state itself.  
 
This is unsurprising given housing’s central role in state restructuring. The retrenchment of 
social housing provision and ideological prioritisation of homeownership are core 
components of neoliberalisation (Madden and Marcuse, 2016). Moreover, the dramatic if 
variegated expansion of debt-based homeownership – facilitated reciprocally by the 
expansion and increased interdependence of financial markets – as a dominant housing 
tenure has been instrumental in configuring new neoliberalised systems of asset-based 
welfare (Brenner, 2006). The expansion of credit to prop up consumer spending coupled 
with the growing treatment of housing as an appreciative asset reconfigured the debt-
property relationship and shifted the responsibility of welfare from the state to 
individualised households (Harvey, 2010). In this sense, housing has been central to the 
evolution of state neoliberalisation, in driving economic growth through construction, 
speculation and new rounds of credit through mortgage markets, and in welfare 
restructuring. All of this suggests a reciprocal and circular relationship between 
neoliberalisation and financialisation, with the political shifts of the former both 
necessitating and facilitating the qualitiative transformations and enabling technologies of 
the latter. However, in broader efforts to explain the GFC, the specific affordances of 
financialisation and its temporal and geographical differentiation were sometimes too easily 
subsumed into epochal narratives of neoliberalisation.  
 
The growing interest in the financialisation of housing regimes internationally has, however,  
been met by a burgeoning and increasingly heterogeneous field of research. On the one 
hand, housing financialisation is considered in terms of “common trajectories” (Fernandez 
and Albers 2016) emerging with housing’s progressive repositioning from being a key 
component of state welfare provision to a market-provided model underpinned by private 
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homeownership and the expansion of mortgage markets, culminating in the 2008 GFC. 
While these shifts most pressingly impact access to housing, their reach extends into other 
areas of neoliberal state restructuring (such as planning, taxation and rental regulation) and, 
thus, can be associated with variegated neoliberalisation. On the other hand, housing 
financialisation, particularly its post-GFC iterations, is increasingly examined as a “practical 
accomplishment” (Fields, 2018): a differentiated phenomenon enacted and embedded in 
specific contexts and practices via a range of actors operating with differential levels of 
agency. Working productively across these inter-related strands of analysis, the research on 
post-GFC housing financialisation has extended the frame of analysis from mortgage 
markets to include public housing (Aalbers et al, 2017), land (Ward and Swyngedouw, 2018), 
and investment strategies (van Loon and Aalbers, 2017). This research has sought both to 
interrogate post-crisis trajectories and strategies of financial actors and to re-examine the 
co-evolving history of financialisation and neoliberal restructuring. For example, a particular 
focus has been the intensified ‘privatised financialisation’ of rental housing, pre-GFC by 
private equity and hedge funds and extending post-GFC to real estate investment trusts 
(REITs) and publicly listed real estate firms (Fields and Uffer, 2016). Wijburg et al’s (2018) 
heuristic of rental housing financialisation 1.0 and 2.0 illustrates this pivot. Crucially, such 
analyses argue that the GFC was not a radical break in housing financialisation, but rather 
that pre- and post-GFC phases are deeply embedded in the ongoing economic-politico-
ideological project of neoliberalisation (see Ward and Swyngedouw, 2018; Beswick and 
Penny 2018). Post-crisis work, therefore, has emphasised how processes and practices of 
financialisation have been mediated and facilitated by the state in the form of emerging 
policy and market solutions to problems created by regulatory landscapes already strongly 
affected by neoliberalisation.  
 
Our agenda here seeks to build on these research trajectories by tracing the embeddedness 
of financialisation in longer termed and variegated processes of neoliberalisation and 
unpacking the role of the GFC as a critical historical juncture in both neoliberalisation and 
intensified financialisation that is enacted in geographically and temporally differentiated 
ways. As the next section addresses, we seek to shed light on crisis not only as a condition 
experienced in geographically differentiated ways, but as a discursive (conceptual) framing 
that mediates understandings of financialisation and shapes its continued temporally-
differentiated evolution. In turning now to ‘crisis’ itself, we also draw out the value of 
comparison as an analytical method for teasing out these questions. 
 
3. The uses of crisis 
The recent ubiquity of crisis – inclusive of the GFC and associated housing crises – has 
refocused scholarly attention on the concept  (Heslop and Ormerod, 2019). While previous 
theorisations view crisis as signifying a break between historical epochs, Roitman (2013) 
questions the self-evidence of the category ‘crisis’ itself. For Roitman, crisis never “obtains”, 
rather it is declared post-hoc as a means to order and make observable a confluence of 
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other factors and events: “… crisis is not a condition to be observed …it is an observation 
that produces meaning” (p39). Focusing specifically on the GFC, Roitman shows how a range 
of critical and narrative accounts depend on the mobilisation of a demand to identify 
systemic error or failure characterised as ‘crisis’.  Such “crisis-claims” in turn provide the 
historical hinge to separate the before and after of crisis: “a difference between past and 
future” (p7). This hinge enables particular forms of critique that attribute past failures and 
open future possibilities to move beyond them. Roitman insists there is always a gap in the 
explanatory apparatus – typified by the statements like “housing prices started to fall”, 
“mortage rates began to reset” (p44-45) – whereby crisis stands in as a self-referential 
placeholder in the chain of events:  
“Ultimately, the question then arises: when does a credit (asset) become a debt 
(toxic asset) – how do we demarcate the first form from the second? At what point 
do houses figured as equity become figured as debt?... Given the creation of an 
extensive debt market…[or] the widespread practice of debt-financed asset pricing, 
which [were] pursued over a significant period of time… when and how is it marked 
as a sign of crisis?” (Roitman, 2013, 48). 
For Roitman then, crucially, crisis-claims punctuate what, hitherto, had been a set of normal 
market conditions. 
 
Deploying the declaration of crisis as a critical and analytical tool, Roitman argues that crisis 
narratives enable the characterisation of certain elements of markets (such as sub-prime 
mortgages) as “errors” as opposed to ongoing processes of market making and value 
creation. Further, she shows how such market making and value creation are enabled 
through crafting financial techniques and technologies that make financial assets calculative 
and transferrable (e.g. Murphy, 2019). Significantly for Roitman (2013, 77), however, “the 
postulate of crisis seems to obviate the need for such technical accounts”. Drawing on 
Roitman, our analysis seeks to point out the associations between narrative understandings 
of crisis as ‘error’ and specific ‘corrective’ policy and housing market transformations that 
have enabled or anticipated the intensification of financialisation across contexts where 
experiences of the GFC have differed.  
 
Roitman’s treatment of ‘crisis’ also expresses the tensions between understandings of the 
GFC as the pivotal juncture in the emergence of an epoch of capitalism defined by 
deepening, expansive and heterogeneous financial practices and logics, and understandings 
that position financialisation in longer-termed geographically and temporally variegated 
trajectories of neoliberalising capitalism that straddle the decades before and after 2008.  
Some recent housing financialisation literature (e.g., Fields, 2018) has worked productively 
with this tension to tease out the geographically and temporally contingent nature of 
market making (e.g. of single family homes as a new rental asset class) and situate these 
transformations within path dependent trajectories of neoliberal state restructuring. 
Following Roitman, our analysis seeks to highlight where crisis-claims do ambivalent work in 
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their capacity to simultaneously mask these more routinised processes of financial 
reengineering and, simultaneously, open up new spaces for regulatory capture of the state 
to facilitate further housing market financialisation in specific locales.  
 
Building on this literature, we suggest that comparison can be an important tool in this 
regard. Here adopt a meso-level analysis (e.g. Peck, 2013) of how the neoliberal policy 
mechanisms and mobilisations of crisis that undergird and enable the intensification of 
financialisation are differentially embedded in place, if broadly productive of temporally 
varied common trajectories. We deploy comparison to foreground the importance of 
financialisation in longer-term neoliberal housing restructuring while reassessing the GFC in 
two respects;  first, as one important, rather than decisive, moment within longer-term 
forms of housing restructuring; and, second, as a critical discursive and material juncture 
where signficant policy and market interventions enable forms of regulatory capture.  In the 
following analysis of Irish and Australian housing systems, we pivot off the GFC to structure 
our analysis of the longer-term unfolding of housing restructuring in both contexts, while 
highlighting its role as a juncture in deepening or, alternatively, anticipating housing 
financialisation.  
 
4. From welfare to commodity: neoliberalising and financialising housing pre-GFC 
In their analysis of varieties of housing financialisation, Fernandez and Albers (2016) group 
Ireland and Australia in a common trajectory with “high levels of homeownership in 
combination with high to very high mortgage-to-GDP levels” (p92). Nevertheless, academic 
and media discussions of both countries’ experience with property bubbles prior to and 
following the GFC has been divergent: Ireland is viewed as a paradigmatic case of 
financialisation and speculative excess while Australia is viewed as having well regulated 
banks and therefore relatively non-financialised (Murphy, 2011; O’Riain, 2014). Our aim in 
this section is to gently disrupt this narrative by positioning the variegated geographies and 
temporalities of financialisation in both countries in relation to path dependent neoliberal 
restructuring of housing. This was influenced by four key factors: (i) access to mortgage 
credit and development capital; (ii) capital switching and investification of housing; (iii) the 
(neo)liberalisation of planning and taxation regimes; and (iv) the residualisation of social 
housing. We argue that a common trajectory is evident, nothwithstanding important 
differences in the position of each country within the global economy and financial markets 
and in situated policy interventions. These shifts embedded housing financialisation, 
supported and enabled by neoliberalised state restructuring, particularly during from the 
1990s up until the GFC.  
 
4.1. Ireland 
Ireland’s shift from a welfare-based to a marketized model of private homeownership is 
legible from the 1980s but accelerated markedly during the Celtic Tiger boom 1993-2007 
(Kitchin et al, 2012). This involved a number of interdependent factors. As Ireland shifted 
 9 
towards a market-based open economy and neoliberal policy regime, membership of the 
European Union facilitated new flows of credit into the property sector. From the mid-
1980s, Byrne and Norris, 2019 (pg 2) argue the “private housing market was almost entirely 
deregulated, liberalized and financialized… as government mortgage provision and subsidies 
for homeowners were radically reduced; subsidization of the non-profit building societies 
was ended, and most government controls on capital flows, credit availability and interest 
rates were removed”. These policy reforms were bolstered by the boom from the early 
1990s and particularly through Ireland’s membership of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) and its single currency (1999) which reduced exchange rate risk, facilitated low 
interest rates and unleashed major bank funding increased through inter-bank lending on a 
massive scale (Ibid). This saw Irish banks importing capital to finance property construction 
and mortgage credit (O’Riain, 2014). By 2002, the main economic driver shifted from 
export-led growth through foreign direct investment to a debt-fuelled property bubble. In 
policy terms, homeownership was prioritised, investment encouraged, and housing markets 
were viewed a core component of economic growth.   
 
Between 1991 and 2006, 762,541 housing units were built, with 93,419 units built in 2006 
alone. Despite this, the average price for new houses increased dramatically by 429% in 
Dublin and 382% nationally (1991 and 2007)i (Kitchin et al, 2016). The shift to debt-based 
homeownership was lubricated by neoliberal restructuring, as policy switched from social 
provision to incentivising contruction and homeownership. This was further amplified by the 
financialisation of home and mortgage markets in the form of a mortgage credit bubble 
facilitated by the low interest rates that accompanied Ireland’s adoption of the Euro 
(Waldron and Redmond, 2014). The total value of household mortgage debt rose from 
€47.2b to over €139.8b 2002-2007, while the average mortgage nearly doubled (Kitchin et 
al, 2016). The combination of construction and lending bubbles resulted in dramatic 
increases in the number of mortgaged households (+18% 2002-2006) and per-capita levels 
of indebtedness (from €7,000 to c€33,000, 1999-2009) (Waldron and Redmond, 2014: 151). 
The shift to mortgaged homeownership as the dominant tenure was enabled by the 
relaxation of lending restrictions and the introduction of 100% and interest-only mortgages.  
 
The more generalised trend of capital switching into property is evident by the parallel 
expansion of development finance, mortgage finance, and mortgages for second properties. 
Property consumed the vast bulk of available capital at the expense of other sectors, 
increasing from 7% to 28% of total lending 2000–2007 (O’Riain, 2014). The growing 
recognition of housing as an investment asset was reflected in first-time buyers gradually 
being priced out of the market at the expense of household investors. Rapidly rising 
property prices drove growth in the rental sector, particularly in main urban areas. Indeed, 
homeownership rates declined from a peak of 81% in 1991 to 76% in 2007 (Hearne, 2017).   
 
 10 
These shifts towards housing financialisation were imbricated in and facilitated by ongoing 
(neo)liberalisation of the planning system and the realignment of tax regimes favourable to 
debt-based homeownership and property investment (Downey, 2014), including mortgage 
interest relief as a core pillar of tax policy. The state also introduced a range of tax 
incentives for urban and rural renewal from 1986, extended nationally up until the GFC 
(Kitchin et al, 2012). Furthermore, the government rebalanced the burden of tax from 
income to indirect taxations accruing from the buying and selling of property, rendering 
stamp duty, capital gains tax and VAT significant contributors to tax. Indeed, such was the 
shift that the property market accounted for 17% of total tax revenue in 2006, up from 5% 
in 1998 (Kitchin et al, 2012).  
 
The combination of roll-out neoliberal policies in support of property and the availability of 
credit resulted in further residualisation and marketisation of social housing. The sector 
shrank from 31% of total housing output in the 1960s to just 10.8% in the 2000s. Key to this 
was the introduction in 2000 of neoliberal planning measures that tied the provision of new 
social housing to private sector delivery of homes. Additionally, the government introduced 
a policy of placing social housing tenants in private rental with state subsidy to landlords. By 
the mid-2000s this had become “an officially sanctioned replacement for [traditional] social 
housing” (Byrne and Norris, 2019, 9-10). From 1994 to 2006, rent supplement claimants 
increased by 108% whereas social housing tenants increased by just 23.6%.  
 
These transformations were the outcome of longer-term neoliberal restructuring, enabled 
and amplified by financialisation; the flow of development finance and mortgage credit 
through Ireland’s membership of the EMU and the resultant credit bubble that drove a 
sharp appreciation of house prices and intensified investification. This amplification was 
geographically and temporally specific; layered onto a pre-existing property boom and 
related policy tendencies towards globalisation and deregulation set in motion by the first 
phase of the Celtic Tiger (Kitchin et al, 2012). However, crucially, the extent of housing 
restructuring during this period was only possible via the assemblage of technologies and 
practices associated with the financialisation of home and mortgage markets. Cumulatively 
these shifts amplified the importance of housing to the wider economy, leaving Ireland 
deeply exposed to the GFC.  
 
4.2 Australia 
Ireland shared common longterm trajectories with Australia: a growing property bubble 
underpinned by debt-based homeownership, growing investification of housing and the 
residualisation of social housing. Nonetheless, exploring these trajectories unearths 
important differentiations in path dependent neoliberalisation as well as the geographies 
and temporalities of housing financialisation.  
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Australia’s longterm status as a homeownership society shifted over the last three decades  
towards debt-based homeownership. Unlike Ireland’s entailment in the EMU, Australia’s 
capacity to set its own fiscal and financial regulatory practices led to a relatively 
conservative regime of lending standards, full-recourse lending for housing, and limited 
securitization, imposed by the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA). Despite 
the entrance of non-bank housing lenders from the late 1980s (peaking at 15% of the 
mortgage market), the vast majority of housing credit has been provided by the four 
dominant retail banks (Debelle, 2010) which have been less reliant on international capital 
to finance construction and mortgage credit (Murphy, 2011). Indeed, the residential 
property market boom that took hold in Australia from 1996 was underpinned by 
fundamental demand generated by a booming resource economy (Yates and Milligan, 
2007). Australia’s state-controlled system of land release and contract method of house 
construction also curtailed excessive supply compared to Ireland’sii. Yet similar rapid price 
inflation ensued. Longterm house price escalation (at c.2% p.a. from the 1970s) shifted in 
the mid 1990s to rapid uplift (c.7% p.a., reaching 15% p.a. in 2001-03), with prices rising 
faster than incomes since the early 2000s (Murphy, 2011). Between 2001 and 2011, 
Australian house prices rose by 147%, outstripping household income growth by 90% 
(Gurran and Phibbs, 2015). A rapid increase in the demand for mortgage lending ensued, 
both to owner-occupiers and, crucially, investors, with a steady increase from 1990 until 
2007. Over the same period, household indebtedness rose from 45% of GDP to above 100% 
(Heath et al, 2018). By 2007, 86% of this debt was attributed to mortgages (BIS, 2017). The 
expansion of mortgage credit grew faster than housing supply which further increased 
prices, laying the foundations for a housing affordability crisis (Yates, 2011).  
 
As in Ireland, state policy increasingly privileged homeownership and housing investment as 
an asset class. A first-time buyers grant in 2000 fuelled both homeownership and wider 
trends of housing’s investification (Daley et al. 2018) promoted by easy access to low-
interest mortgage finance and favourable tax treatment of rental investment (Gurran and 
Phibbs, 2016). Here, again, neoliberal policies, housing system restructuring and state 
facilitation of financialisation are intertwined. The proportion of bank lending concentrated 
in the housing sector rose precipitously from 25% in the early nineties to above 55% by 
2005 (Bullock, 2018). Since deregulation in the mid 1980s,  the banking system became 
increasingly willing to finance loans with ‘loan to value’ ratios approaching 100% and to 
provide higher risk mortgage products (Burke and Hulse, 2010). Importantly however, the 
expansion of housing credit remained more prudentially regulated than was the case 
internationally (Murphy, 2011).  
  
Nonetheless, the expansion of mortgage credit and related household indebtedness was 
stoked by a pro-investment taxation regime. This reflected a shift to asset-based welfare 
and fashioned households as agents of financialisation, thus amplifying the housing boom 
(Yates and Milligan, 2007). This regime, underlain by neoliberal logics, exempted the owner-
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occupied ‘family home’ from capital gains tax (since 1985), state land tax and the aged-
pension assets test; enabled ‘negative gearing’iii (1986); and awarded 50% capital gains tax 
discount on investment properties (1999). As in Ireland, these pro-market measures 
fostered ‘mum and dad’ investment in housing and produced a rental sector dominated by 
smallscale landlords (Martin et al, 2018), at least until the GFC. Rental investors doubled 
from 15% to 29% of the market 1996-2007 (Burke and Hulse, 2010) and loans to investors 
increased from c.25% to c40% between the mid 1990s and 2011, including via the rapid 
expansion of interest-only mortgages (Yates 2014). The private rental sector expanded from 
18% to 25% of total housing stock between 1994/95–2011/12 (AIHW, 2015). All these shifts 
were enabled by the proliferation of financial technologies and instruments, underwritten 
by a tax regime that contributed substantially to producing markets in which these 
techniques could be rolled out. 
 
Other dimensions of neoliberalising housing policy further facilitated housing 
financialisation. Even as the housing boom was creating deepening difficulties for low-
income households, state-provided social housing and affordable private rental were 
residualised (Gurran and Phibbs, 2016). Construction of Australia’s already modest social 
housing stock had been contracting since the late 1980s and was further decreased by  
‘right -to-buy’ schemes. Social housing declined from a high of 12% of total housing output 
in the mid 1980s to just 3.9% by 2011/12 (Gurran and Brambley, 2018), failing to keep pace 
with need since the 1990s. Like Ireland, housing assistance migrated towards the social 
welfare portfolios, reflecting the growing entrenchment of social housing as an ‘exceptional’ 
tenure of last resort and creating market opportunites for subsidised rental and low income 
housing providers. 
 
Australia’s path dependent neoliberal housing restructuring varies from Ireland’s in that 
social housing (and its restructuring) was less significant and macro-prudential regulations 
on both lending and land release stemmed the bubble economy. Nevertheless, Australia’s 
housing regime was characterised by a similar intersection of state policy facilitating asset-
based welfare, nurturing market-making, and the financialisation of home and mortgage 
markets. Australia’s housing market restructuring was driven particularly via a pro-
investment taxation regime that shaped households as investor subjects, facilitated capital 
switching, and escalated a housing boom, albeit within a better regulated and capitalised 
financial sector. These trends were further entrenched through the 1990s and 2000s.  
 
 
5. From GFC to post-crisis housing systems: Continuity and Change 
The GFC forms an important juncture in trajectories of housing financialisation both in 
Ireland and Australia. Rather than constituting a radical break (cf. Wijburg et al, 2018), the 
GFC enabled differentiated national policy and market responses that nonetheless, in both 
contexts, engendered partial continuations of pre-crisis policies and agendas along with 
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housing financialisation, if with divergent temporalities. Following Roitman, we suggest 
below that the observation of the crash as ‘crisis’ produced differentiated understandings of 
the GFC, enabling these differentiated responses. In what follows, we analyse post-GFC 
shifts as the outcome of an interplay between (i) neoliberal path dependencies (a form of 
regulatory and ideological inertia) and (ii) the geographically and temporally uneven 
mutation of financialisation practices as crisis claims buoyed the agency of various financial 
actors (including the state) to capitalise on the crisis and shift more sectors of the housing 
system towards financialisation.  
 
5.1 Ireland: intensified financialisation    
The GFC hit Ireland with particular force due to the economy’s exposure to inter-bank 
borrowing, facilitated by EMU membership and the concentration of international capital in 
property and mortgage lending (O’Riain, 2014). As actors at various scales scrambled to 
respond to Ireland’s financial and property crash (itself embroiled in the wider Eurozone 
financial crisis), a range of ad hoc policy interventions created conditions for significant 
market re-engineering. Three key moves defined the Irish Government’s response to the 
GFC: the guarantee of all Irish-owned banks’ assets and liabilities; an extensive bank 
recapitalisation programme; and the establishment of the National Asset Management 
Agency (NAMA), a ‘bad bank’ tasked with acquiring largescale real estate loans (above €5m) 
from five of Ireland’s most important banks and their disposal to maximize valueiv. This 
initial response was instrumental in the Government’s accepting an IMF-EU-ECB bailout 
package in late 2010: a move essentially pre-determined by Ireland’s position within the 
EMU (O’Riain, 2014). Here we can note a number of important factors. First, Ireland’s EMU 
membership heavily circumscribed its ability to respond to the GFCv. Second, the ad hoc 
working out of the financial and property crash on the ground reflects Ireland’s 
“commonsense” approach to neoliberalism (Kitchin et al, 2012) while further conditioning 
the course of housing restructuring. Finally, crisis claims were mobilised by various actors to 
deepen and transform housing financialisation.  
 
Following the crash, house prices fell by 57.5% in Dublin and 48.7% in the rest of the country 
(CSO, 2015). Unfinished or ‘ghost estates’ proliferatedvi (Kitchin et al, 2014), while Ireland 
experienced one of the highest mortgage default rates of any countryvii. The stark imprint of 
residential vacancy and oversupply led to a sudden collapse in development finance. 
Nonetheless, in line with Ireland’s neoliberal path dependency, resolution was largely left to 
a series of measures that worked with the grain of market forces (Kitchin et al, 2014). 
Relying on housing market rebound has been the tacit state policy for mitigating the most 
trenchant aspects of the debt crisis. Nonetheless, new lending restrictions were introduced 
in 2015 by the Irish Central Bank (a body independent from government)viii. While these 
were softened following lobbying from the construction and property industry, they 
significantly curtailed the expansion of mortgage credit (Waldron, 2019). The Irish reponse 
to the GFC, thereore, involved ad hoc and contested actions of diverse actors within and 
 14 
beyond the state. While some specific re-regulation was introduced, the path dependent 
state reponse opened up other areas of the housing sector to regulatory capture by 
financialised actors.  
 
One evident impact of this (crisis-talk facilitated) capture is the growing significance of the 
private rental sector as a tenure and site of investment, aligning with Aalbers’ (2015) 
periodisation of post-crisis housing conditions. While house prices have slowly crept back 
towards 2006 peaks, private rental expanded to 18.6% of total households by 2011 (from 
8.1% in 1991) (Byrne and Norris, 2019) and private rents increased by 75% nationally 
between 2012 and 2019. A marked acceleration post-crisis has been driven by interlocking 
factors which property interests—from household investors to international private equity 
firms—have cultivated and exploited. New mortgage lending restrictions have resulted in 
higher-earning households spending longer in private rental and the almost complete 
collapse of construction levels have pushed up average asking rents: in Dublin by 65% 2010 
to 2016 (Daft, 2016). More central to our argument here is that the nature of investment in 
the rental sector has undergone substantial structural transformation, with Dublin 
particularly becoming “a testbed for financial and property market restructuring” (Waldron 
2019) . 
 
These  transformations in the property-finance nexus were enacted both through 
government policy responses to crisis and the related opening up of new housing market 
opportunities for increasingly influential financial actors. NAMA quickly became the largest 
player in Dublin’s property market (Byrne, 2016) and was instrumental in facilitating the 
entry of a new set of ‘global players’, including private equity funds, vulture funds and REITs, 
especially in Dublin. NAMA explicitly courted institutional investorsix who, in turn, 
successfully lobbied for legislation to allow for REITs for the first time (Waldron, 2018). In 
the post-crash period, Buy-to-Let (BTL) and homeowner lending has contracted significantly, 
being replaced by large numbers of purchases by landlords with cash/equity, REITs and 
international property companies. The importance of institutional investors grew 
substantially: from 3.6% to 22.5% of residential property purchases and from 15.5% and 
48% of residential landlord purchases 2010-2017 (Byrne and Norris 2019, 13). REITs have 
been particularly influential in shifting the terrain. Ireland’s largest private landlord IRES, for 
example, has acquired disproportional power to set market rents in particular geographical 
areas. Rising valuations attract more investor interest in REITs and allow them to draw down 
more debt for further investment, intensifying the cycle of financialisation (Waldron, 2018).  
 
Finally, social housing provision has been further tied to private rental via the state’s policy 
shift towards subsidisation of private landlords for housing social tenants. The Housing 
Assistance Payment (HAP), which allows claimants to rent private dwellings while rent is 
paid by the government, was layered onto existing forms of rent supplement in 2014,  
becoming a pillar of the government’s housing strategy (Department of Housing, 2016). 
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Funding for social housing fell by 88% 2008 -2014 and output contracted dramatically from 
7588 to 642 units (Byrne and Norris, 2019), while the number of households receiving HAP 
increased from 505 in 2005 to 22,020 in 2014 (c7% of all private-rented tenancies)x. The 
rapid expansion of these subsidies has underpinned the investification of private rental by 
putting a floor on rents and pushing a growing segment of households into financial market 
cycles.  
 
Legitimated as crisis-response, the Irish government’s ad hoc and pro-market actions have 
enabled significant transformations in a short time period. These responses have created 
the conditions for intensified housing financialisation, opened up new sectors of housing to 
financialisation and, in turn, fuelled severe crises of both affordability and homelessness 
(Hearne, 2020). Post-crisis restructuring of Ireland’s housing regime is thus an intertwined 
outcome of state policy (which both continued existing neoliberal trajectories and 
introduced radical measures that facilitated further finacialisation), re-regulation that has 
created new market opportunities, and financial actors capitalising on crisis conditions to 
move into new sectors, further restructuring the housing-finance nexus.  
 
5.2 Australia: protecting a marketized housing regime  
Comparatively, Australia’s response to the GFC has not involved such dramatic restructuring 
of the property-finance nexus. Indeed, the dominant media and academic narrative has 
been of ‘Australian exceptionalism’ (Conley, 2018): the absence of a property crash 
following the GFC-induced credit crunch, resulting both from Australia’s relative position 
with the global economy and financial markets, and from a series of protective post-crisis 
policy interventions. These interventions also arguably set the conditions for the 
intensification of housing financialisation, if with a different temporality to Ireland’s. 
 
A number of factors protected Australia from GFC contagion. Exposure to risks associated 
with the US-subprime crash was limited by Australia’s strong resource economy, banks’ 
better capitalisation, limited exposure to international borrowing and prudential lending 
practices. Furthermore, unlike Ireland, the Australian state had autonomy to set fiscal policy 
responses and these focussed on reasserting the extant houing regime, legitimated as 
protecting the housing sector from market failures and crisis impacts. In contrast with the 
pro-cyclical nature of Irish housing policy (Byrne and Norris, 2018), Australian Federal and 
state governments took counter-cyclical steps post-GFC. Large deposits and wholesale 
funding guarantees were in place during 2008-2010, but further bank guarantees were 
unnecessary given careful regulation (Murphy, 2011). Rather, the policy focus fell on 
boosting construction and reinforcing the system of debt-based homeownership and 
investification. A two-year $42b Nation Building Economic Stimulus Plan (NBESP), supported 
by state-specific programs, stabilised the housing construction industry by funding more 
than $6.2b in social housing development (Ruming, 2014) and the simultaneous boosting 
the first-home buyers grant program causing a spike in lending (Daley et al, 2018). 
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Restrictions on foreign investment in property were also temporarily loosened in an effort 
to ensure prices remained buoyant.  
 
Thus the GFC constituted an important juncture enabling reinforcement of a debt-based 
and moderately-financialised housing model, notwithstanding increasingly problematic 
outcomes for affordability (Yates, 2014). Relatedly, the post-crisis period witnessed a 
continuation of asset price inflation and investification, with residential property investment 
remaining a lucrative strategy for households due to a largely unchanged regulatory and 
taxation landscape (Conley, 2018, 50). Financial logics have extended as historically low 
interest rates fuelled debt-financed investment in private-rental dwellings. Lending to 
investors increased by 42% 2006-16 compared to 8.4% for owners-occupation, while 
interest-only loans (a hallmark of household investment in rental property) grew to a 2015 
peak at 46% of new mortgages (Heath et al, 2018, Hulse et al, 2018). Notwithstanding 
APRA’s recent intervention that limits debt-to-income ratios, no-interest loans, and caps 
total lending to property investors, “…financial excesses have built up in the Australian 
economy… [which connect] Australian households to both domestic and global processes of 
financialisation” (Conley, 2018, 42). Banks have up to 70% of their loan-books exposed to 
the property sector, and the major Australian banks’ mortgages equate to 80% of national 
GDP (Heath et al, 2018).  
 
Australia’s system of development finance and mortgage credit has remained largely 
unchanged, unlike Ireland’s. The financial sector remains concentrated around the four ‘big 
banks’xi who sustained strong profit performance through and beyond the GFC (KPMG, 
2017). Indeed, the reassertion of the extant neoliberalised housing system, legitimised by 
GFC crisis-talk, supported this performance as it sustained house price inflation and demand 
for mortage credit (RBA, 2017). Prices more than doubled in real terms 1997-2017, 
notwithstanding the GFC, and after short-term dipsxii Sydney house prices increased 70% 
2012-2017 (Burke, 2018). Consequently, Australian household indebtedness has risen to the 
highest level among G20 nations at 190% of disposable income (Heath et al, 2018). Over half 
of state and local government taxation revenue is property-related via land tax, rates, 
transaction taxes including stamp duties (CoreLogic, 2016). This position is largely supported 
by the banking system, which has little reason to seek to unravel the dominant modelxiii. 
Shifting this politico-complex has proven “a diabolical political issue” (Daley et al, 2018), 
with no government prepared to alienate the interests entailed in an increasingly 
financialized housing system. 
 
While crisis talk has shored up the neoliberalised housing regime, it has also enabled new 
policy supports to facilitate the creation of new financialised market opportunities in the 
private rental and social housing sectors.  Private rental has expanded as both a tenure and 
an investment, belatedly being primed for wider institutional investment. Whereas in 
Ireland this shift has been buoyed by the introduction of a new set of global players, rental 
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investment in Australia has been underpinned initially by the  emergence of “generation 
rent” driven by the growing unaffordability of homeownership (Maalsen, 2018). Private 
rental grew by 38% 2006-16, twice the rate of household growth, to reach 26% of all 
households and is now the fasted growing sector in the Australian housing system (Hulse et 
al, 2018). Crucially, recent developments suggest ripening opportunities for larger-scale 
institutional investment and financialization. While large corporate landlords are still largely 
absent, with the exception of the off-campus student housing sectors (Pawson et al, 2019), 
growth in the private rental sector has begun to draw in real estate companies and 
developers, attracted to yield models such as build-to-rent (BtR). The NSW government 
established a BtR taskforce in 2017, aiming to build momentumxiv.  Thus both contexts are 
tracking a common trajectory, but enacted through a different set of agents and processes, 
and unfolding at different temporalities.  
 
Finally, further market opportunities for financial interests are being curated via the 
continued post-crisis residualisation of social housing. Despite continuously rising demand, 
between 2008/9 and 2016/17 social housing stock has not kept pace, falling from 5.1 to 4.6 
per 100 households between 2007/08 and 2016/17 (AIWH, 2018). Financial techniques are 
being devised to fund provision both through non-state community housing providers 
(CHPs) and market-based providers. For instance, a National Housing Finance and 
Investment Corporation was established in 2017 to act as a ‘bond aggregator’ to finance for 
CHPs . This is paralleled by longer-termed transitioning people from social to market 
housing and by financial innovation via the Social and Affordable Housing Fund, geared to  
increase private-sector involvement and decrease government “dominance” of the social 
housing system (NSW Government 2016, 6).  
 
In one sense, the Australian housing system has largely absorbed the ‘crisis’ substantively 
unchanged, as the observation of crisis enabled a reassertion of the existing, moderately-
financialised housing regime. However, rather than indicating a different trajectory, this 
suggests a different geographical and temporal relationship mediating the general and 
specific transformations wrought by the GFC in Australia. The intertwinement of 
neoliberalising policy stances with financialisation processes continues as nascent 
conditions for more intenstive financialisation appear on the horizon. Despite rising 
challenges of affordability, now regularly referred to as a crisis of another kind, little 
appetite has been shown to introduce measures to reposition the basis of housing provision 
or to introduce macro-prudential measures that limit the appetite for further house price 
escalation or further financialisation (Conley, 2018).  
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6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has aimed to tease out the entanglement of neoliberalisation/financialisation in 
housing restructuring, situating these processes geographically and temporally and in 
relation to differential experiences of the GFC. Our comparative approach enables us to 
trace financialisation’s contingent layering onto processes of neoliberalisation, and pinpoint 
moments wherein financialisation both accelerates and is itself amplified in path dependent 
trajectories. We draw particular attention to the lubricating role of crisis and ‘crisis-talk’ in 
facilitating regulatory restructuring through financialised logics, and the geographical and 
temporal differentiations that eventuate.  
 
Ireland’s and Australia’s common trajectories, pre-GFC, are etched in long term state 
privileging of home-ownership, amplified by a mortgage credit explosion and paralleled by 
more general capital switching into property. Both countries also residualised social 
housing, while escalating house prices and household investment readied the private rental 
sector for amplified institutional investment and related financialisation. While Australia’s 
more prudential regulation of the property-finance nexus cushioned it from the worst 
impacts of the GFC, Ireland was exposed as particularly vulnerable to the external economic 
shock of the crash. As governments in each case responded to the declared crisis of the 
global financial system in divergent yet broadly comparable ways, financialisation’s layering 
across the continuation of modulated versions of ad-hoc neoliberalism is traceable. In 
Ireland, the crash formed a juncture for regulatory capture by financial actors as crisis 
discourse facilitated exceptional policy interventions that would radically accelerate and 
transform housing financialisation. In Australia, a discourse of ‘Australian exceptionalism’ 
legitimised policy responses that shored up the existing neoliberalised housing system while 
also anticipating and facilitating the expansion of financialisation, leaving housing markets 
vulnerable to its impacts. Despite their differences, the overarching response in both 
countries has been to reassert broadly neoliberal stances and shore up the hegemony of 
debt-based home-ownership and its undergirding institutions. Crucially too, encouraged by 
market actors, each has established alternative avenues and techniques for financialization: 
in Ireland, for example, amplified by NAMA’s operation and in Australia via the construction 
of markets for rent-yielding assets underpinned by growing demand from ‘generation rent’.  
 
These responses do not constitute the GFC as a radical break, yet they reflect the 
mobilisation of ‘crisis’ to leverage policy shifts and enable the implanting and diffusion of 
financial techniques and logics as pre-conditions for deepening housing’s financialisation. In 
Ireland pro-market approach to recovery, alongside more interventionist resurrection of the 
banking and property sectors enabled the entry of new international financial actors and 
monopoly interests who have capitalised on the crisis by buying up distressed debt and 
consolidating their position. In Australia, the stimulus packages propped up the broad debt-
based homeownership model and significant moves have been made to nurture the 
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creation of markets for residential REITsxv and other financial vehicles and to leverage their 
role in the expansion of private rental (Newell et al, 2015). Post-GFC analysis tellingly 
reveals how crisis is leveraged contingently via key actors, policies and institutions to 
accomplish further intensification of financialisation and amplify wider processes of 
housing’s neoliberalisation, even as temporalities are distinctive.   
 
At the time of writing, COVID-19 looms: a crisis of another kind with vast potential to enable 
a step-change in housing’s financialisation. Both Ireland and Australia are on the cusp of 
further housing restructuring, tied to wider recessions. As economic distress ripples 
outwards, forced sales are likely to eventuate among small-scale housing investors, enabling 
large-scale institutional investors to gain a foothold, particularly in Australia where hitherto 
this has not happened. Our comaprative analysis has shown how Australia’s moderately 
financialised system is already primed for this structural transformation. Moreover, as Fields 
(2018) demonstrates, innovative financial techniques have proliferated to enable the 
identification, valuing, consolidation and transfer of distressed housing ‘assets’; thus 
lubricating the job of market and regulatory capture through automation. It behoves 
housing analysts to keep close watch on the moves of financial actors, the extent to which 
states facilitates new financialisied market opportunities in response to crisis claims, and the 
role this new crisis plays in articulating with longer termed path dependent trajectories in 
geographically and temporally-specific contexts. 
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i Second hand homes followed a similar trend, increasing by 555% and 489% over the same period. 
ii The contract method involves developers acquiring land, obtaining zoning, clearing, subdividing and 
providing infrastructure before selling to individual builders or households for subsequent construction. This 
limits speculation and ties production more closely to demand (Burke and Hulse 2010, 827). 
iii Negative gearing allows for losses made on investments such as real estate to be deducted from taxable 
income derived from all other sources. 
iv As noted by Waldron (2018, 210) “NAMA became a repository for the failed development-finance sector as 
11,000 loans secured against 60,000 properties with an initial loan value of €74 billion were transferred to 
NAMA at a cost of €32bn”. 
v EMU enabled the free flow of capital from European into Irish banks during the boom, but subsequently 
constrained its ability to respond to the GFC towards financialised measures. 
vi 2846 were identified in 2010 (Kitchin et al, 2014). 
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vii 11% of principal dwelling mortgages were in arrears as late as March 2016 (Central Bank, 2017). 
viii These restricted loan-to-value ratios and applied a 3.5 loan-to-income ratio to all borrowers 
ix See Byrne (2016) for an exposition of NAMA’s (i) sale of a large volume of loans over a short time frame; (ii) 
disposal of these assets primarily through large portfolios of loans backed by real estate; (iii) provision of 
‘vendor finance' and establishing joint ventures; and (iv) promotion the introduction of REITs. 
x If rent supplement claimants are added, by 2014 almost one-third of all private renting tenancies were 
receiving government subsidy (Byrne and Norris, 2019, 10). 
xi The ‘big four’ banks account for 90% of the financial system and 25% of the ASX200. 
xii Dips of less than 5% in 2008/09 and c2% in 2011/12 were experienced. 
xiii The Head of Westpac’s Consumer Bank has argued “this whole notion that you want a system where house 
prices drop is flawed. It is over $7 trillion in terms of an asset. If that loses value it will destabilise the 
economy...This is not about house prices going down, this is about ensuring that those who find it difficult to 
raise a deposit have avenues into getting into home-ownership” (Smith, 2017). 
xiv Thus far, the financial models to accommodate this (e.g. REITs) have largely been confined to commercial 
property investment.  
xv No residential REIT is yet available in Australia, despite their flourishing in other property sectors (Wong 
2017). 
